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As international trade between China and the United
States has increased markedly in recent years, negotiation
behavior between Chinese and Americans has become a timely
issue.

Most research conducted in this area discusses the

fundamental cultural differences between East and West, as
well as the difficulties Westerners have in negotiating with
the Chinese. Little was written on the actual negotiation
behavior itself.
This paper is focused on the negotiation behavior
between Chinese and American business people.

Following a

review of relevant research, the author found that both
Confucian philosophy and Taoistic philosophy continue to
provide the foundations of Chinese cultural traditions and
values, which influence Chinese perceptions and approaches
to conflict resolution and thus affect Chinese negotiation
behavior.

Cultural values discussed include harmony,

collectivism, conformity, holism-contextualism, time, face,
shame, reciprocity, high context, friendship, and Guanxi.
The author suggests that traditional Chinese cultural values
vi

influence Chinese people to be less openly assertive and
emotional in conflict situations, which consequently lead
Chinese negotiators to the adoption of high compromising and
avoiding behaviors and a relatively low preference for
competing and assertive postures in negotiations.
Based on the cultural values and Chinese conflict
preferences, the author offers recommendations for
preparing, conducting, and concluding negotiations with
Chinese people.

vii

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

I became interested in the negotiation behavior of
different cultures in 1988 when I was a graduate student at
Xi'an Foreign Languages University, People's Republic of
China, and was once invited to work as an interpreter for an
American international bank intending to make some
investments in Xi'an, Shaanxi Province, P.R.C.
During the ten days of working as an interpreter, I
noticed some subtle differences of negotiation styles
between the Chinese local officials and the American bank
officials.

For example, while the American bank officials

wanted to get down quickly to key issues such as choosing
the site of the factory, the estimated total cost, the
contribution of money to the joint venture by each side, and
the dividends of future benefits, the Chinese local
officials were not -in a hurry to do so.

They were more

interested in the socializing activities such as taking the
American guests sightseeing, or showing them local special
products and foods.
When the actual negotiation meetings began, the
1

1

<L

Americans did most of the talking and argued firmly for
their positions, while the Chinese sat there quietly most of
the time, responding now and then, yet firmly holding their
ground.
failure.

The negotiation of the joint venture ended in
The American bank officials left without signing

any contract.

I regretted this conclusion for a long time,

and ever since then, I have kept asking myself the questions
"Why would two parties with good intentions to do business
with each other fail?

What could be done to prevent the

failures?
My enthusiasm in studying negotiation behavior between
Chinese and American business people began in 1993 when I
started my graduate program in the Department of
Communication and Broadcasting, Western Kentucky University.
After taking courses such as intercultural

communication,

foundations of communication and nonverbal communication, I
came to realize the importance of cultural factors in
influencing intercultural business negotiation outcomes.
Thus began my two years of research in the field of business
negotiations between Chinese and American business people.

Objective of the Study

The purpose of this study is to understand the effects
of culture on the negotiation process--specifically,

the
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effects of Chinese culture on the negotiation behavior of
the Chinese.

According to Fisher and Ury, negotiation "is a

basic means of getting what you want from others"
and Ury, 1981, p. 2).

(Fisher

Unterman sees negotiation as "a

process wherein two or more people get together for the
purpose of changing each other's values and behaviors"
(Unterman, 1985, p. 51).

Nierenberg believes that "whenever

people exchange ideas with the intention of changing
relationships, whenever they confer for agreement, they are
negotiating

(Nierenberg, 1988, p. 37).

Culture has been defined as "the symbolic-expressive
aspect of human behavior" and "the totality of man's
products"
35).

(Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen, and Kurweil, 1984, p.

Harris and Moran define culture as "the way of living

developed and transmitted by a group of human beings,
consciously or unconsciously to subsequent generations"
(Harris and Moran, 1991, p. 135).

To Cohen, culture is

"fundamentally a property of information, a grammar for
organizing reality, for importing meaning to the world"
(Cohen, 1991, p. 10).

Mazrui believes culture has four

dimensions which create the social whole: the kinship
culture, the intellectual culture, the economic culture, and
the political culture.

Mazrui holds:

The kinship culture is concerned with the issue of
descent, marriage, succession, and kinship
loyalties, obligations and entitlement.
The
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intellectual culture is that part of the system
which provides the framework of reasoning, the
pre-suppositions of inference and deduction, the
basic ideas of intellectual discourse and the
boundaries of analytical and abstract thought.
Economic culture defines the means of production
and livelihood in society, the techniques of
exchange, and the values and norms underlying and
motivating economic behavior.
Political culture
means the values, prejudices, inhibition, and
ideas. The ideas condition political behavior in
a given society. Also, it helps to determine the
nature of political institutions and the direction
of political change. (Mazrui, 1976, pp. 75-76).
Mentioned above are various definitions of culture and
negotiation. In fact, culture and negotiation are closely
related.

Culture plays a very important part in business

transaction and in negotiation.

This study is concentrated

on negotiations between Chinese and American business
people.

Specifically, it focuses on the influence of

Chinese cultural factors on Chinese conflict management
preferences and subsequent negotiating and bargaining
behavior.
In recent years there have been a number of suggestive
applications of the intercultural communication approach to
the field of international business negotiation.

One

application has taken the detailed, historical case study.
Jim Mann

(1989) examines business negotiations between

American Motors Corporation and Beijing Jeep in the 1980s
and concludes that cultural and bureaucratic obstacles are
major difficulties for Westerners in doing business in

5
China.

However, respecting each other's cultural traditions

and values and compromising each other's stands or positions
may serve as remedy for Sino-American business practices.
A second approach to culture and negotiation focuses
not so much on the bilateral chemistry of a negotiation as
on national negotiation styles taken as subjects of
investigation in their own right.

Michael Blaker

(1990)

published a useful historical study of Japanese negotiation
behavior in the twentieth century.

Lucian Pye's

(1982) more

conceptual account of Chinese commercial negotiation style,
although brief, provides particular enlightenment given the
author's practical experience as advisor to U.S. government
officials negotiating with the Chinese.

Originally

published by Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Main, Pye's book has
become a classic book on Chinese commercial negotiation
style.
Approaching from different perspectives, both Jim
Mann's detailed, historical study of business negotiations
between Chinese and American business people and Lucian
Pye's more conceptual account of Chinese commercial style
have enriched my knowledge of Sino-American business
negotiations.

In fact, Mann's detailed case study of

business negotiations between American Motors Corporation
and Beijing Jeep has provided me the basic knowledge of what
is really going on between Chinese and American business
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negotiations, while Lucian Pye's study has provided me more
general and conceptual knowledge of Sino-American
negotiation styles.
A third approach to culture and negotiation is provided
by Glen Fisher

(1980), a former foreign service officer with

a background in social anthropology and sociology. According
to Fisher, different values, mannerism, forms of verbal and
nonverbal behavior, and notions of status may block
confidence and impede communication.

Fisher believes

culture impinges on negotiation in four crucial ways: by
conditioning one's perception of reality, by blocking out
information inconsistent or unfamiliar with cultural
grounded assumptions, by projecting meaning onto the otherparty's words and actions, and by possibly impelling the
ethnocentric observer to an incorrect attribution of motive.
Fisher's work provides the first attempt to construct a
systematic theoretical introduction to negotiation and
culture.
Each of these three approaches to culture and
negotiation has its merits and limitations.

The first

approach, the detailed, historical case study, provides us
practical experience on international business negotiation
by focusing on the bilateral chemistry of the negotiation.
It fails, however, to provide the theoretical grounds for
the analysis of the case study.
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The second approach, the national negotiation styles,
offers a general overview of a nation's negotiation styles.
Yet, its limitation lies in its static, one-sided nature
compared with bilateral case studies.

It tends to overlook

the fact that negotiation is a game for more than one
player.
The third approach, the systematic theoretical approach
to international negotiation has its strong merits by
offering comparisons and contrasts about different cultural
assumptions and values which result in different negotiation
patterns.

Although it fails to provide a real-life case of

negotiation practice, its systematic theories have prepared
a solid background for understanding the different
negotiation styles.
In this study I integrate elements of the case study,
national negotiation style, and the conceptual theoretical
approaches described above to form a new comprehensive
approach.

Although I have not incorporated a real-life case

study, I have based my analysis on other people's
observation and experience in Sino-American negotiations as
well as on my own.

Further, I have tried to read as many

books and journal articles about Chinese and American
negotiation styles as possible and have incorporated them
into my study.

As for the conceptual frame of process model

of negotiation, I have examined many other models of

negotiation, and developed one of my own: exploration,
solution building, expectation and finalizing.

Also, I have

selected, among all other various Chinese traditional
values, nine dominant Chinese cultural values which I
consider very important towards understanding Chinese
negotiation behavior.

I have adopted the Thomas Model of

Conflict-Management Styles and have applied it to the study
of Chinese conflict-management preferences.
The assumptions I have made about Chinese conflictmanagement preferences and subsequent negotiation behaviors
may cause controversial reactions.

Nevertheless, it is my

hope that by approaching the study of Chinese negotiation
behavior from a new perspective—discussing the Chinese
negotiation behavior through studying Chinese conflict
management preferences--! may contribute some new insight to
the study of Sino-American business negotiation.

Need for the study

Arnold Toynbee

(Brunner & Wang, 1988, p. 27) strongly

maintains that the 21st century probably belongs to China.
Ever since the implementation of China's open-door policy in
1978, China has become the center of world-wide attention.
China's rich natural resources and vast market potential
offer bright prospects for international trade, commerce,
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and industry.

More and more foreign companies come to China

to trade and to make joint ventures.

In recent years the

international trade between China and the United States has
increased markedly.

China has become one of the major

market places for America.

More American companies come to

China to negotiate and to engage in joint ventures.

Yet,

because of the sharply different backgrounds and sharply
different cultures, not ail negotiations result in success.
Many of them break down because of a variety of
misunderstandings, and misbehavior, thus making differences
in negotiation behavior a timely issue.
Among other factors, effective negotiation depends on
understanding the other side's negotiation practices.
Conduct during negotiation is influenced by attitudes,
customs, and values, which to a great extent lie deeply in a
negotiating team's cultural and social traits.

Different

attitudes, customs, and values can yield significant
differences in psychological processes such as selective
perception and interpersonal attraction, which in turn have
great impact on the eventual outcome of negotiation.
Trading between the Chinese and Americans involves
several major obstacles.

First, the Chinese culture and

American culture diverge widely in the perceptions of time,
individual, society, and interrelationships, which produce
significantly different attitudes and behavior.

For
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example, the Chinese perceive law and the nature of legal
systems much differently than the Americans commonly do.
Extrapolated to the interpersonal level, these differences
create a challenge that American negotiators—individual

or

team--must address when dealing with their Chinese
counterparts.
Second, the different values, beliefs and orientations
of Chinese people have a significant bearing upon Chinese
perceptions and approaches to conflict and lead to
particular preferences with respect to conflict management
styles.

Lack of understanding of the Chinese conflict

management styles usually leads ro misunderstanding between
the two parties, and may sometimes even result in the
failure of negotiations.
This writer endeavors to provide negotiators-particularly Americans--with a rudimentary understanding of
Chinese cultural factors which influence Chinese conflict
resolution preferences and negotiation behavior.

Evidence

suggests that these cultural factors significantly affect
the success or failure of Sino-American negotiations. Pye
(1982), after interviewing U.S. managers who have negotiated
with the Chinese, concludes that "unquestionably the largest
and possibly the most intractable category of problems in
Sino-American business negotiations can be traced to the
cultural differences between the two countries"

(p. 20).
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Another study of American firms that had negotiations with
the Chinese people found that most of these companies
perceived major differences in negotiation styles

(Tung,

1982, p. 57).
According to my familiarity with Chinese business
practices, social customs and interpersonal

relationships

will lead to successful international business negotiations.
Factors which lead to failures of international business
negotiation usually

include communication breakdown,

differences in business practices and negotiation style, and
differences in social customs, culture, and ideology.

For

example, Chinese people like to do business with old
friends.

Thus, interpersonal relationship forms a very

important factor in doing business with the Chinese.

Also,

Chinese people put much emphasis on the notion of "face":
the "loss of face" or "not giving face" will cause disgrace
on the Chinese side.

Consequently, "giving face" to the

Chinese and not causing them to "lose face" becomes very
important in Sino-American business negotiation.
Following a brief review of the literature of
negotiations between Chinese and American business people, I
will discuss extensively the influence of Chinese cultural
factors on the development of Chinese psyche, on Chinese
conflict-management preferences, and on Chinese negotiation
behavior.
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Value of this Study

Among studies of negotiation behavior conducted in the
United States, little has been written on marketing
negotiation behaviors between Chinese and Americans.

While

there is no lack of anecdotal and descriptive evidence
confirming East/West differences and difficulties Westerners
have in negotiating with the Chinese, little research exists
documenting the actual negotiation behavior itself.
This study is focused on the negotiation behavior
between Chinese and American business people.

Specifically,

I discuss the cultural influences on the Chinese
psychologies and the Chinese conflict management preferences
in negotiations.

What can be learned from the experiences

of business should be of value for government-to-government.
negotiations, given the substantial differences between
commercial and diplomatic relationships.
At present, both Beijing and Washington wish to put
their adversarial competition behind them and seek a more
cooperative and complementary relationship.

Thus, if

Americans can better understand the Chinese style of
negotiating in the commercial realm, they may avoid
misunderstandings and achieve desired goals in the political
realm.

Thus, this writer aims to provide American

negotiators a better chance to understand the Chinese
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negotiation behavior, which will lead to a greater
opportunity to succeed in negotiating with Chinese people-a benefit to both countries involved.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE

International trade between China and the United States
began in 1978 just after the normalization of Sino-American
relations.

For the first time in history, the U.S.-China

trade negotiation became a popular topic.

Many books were

written on Chinese cultures, the East-West differences, and
the difficulties Westerners have in negotiating in China.
Among the early research, Harris and Moren

(1979)

offered new insight into the Chinese perception of dignity
as well as Chinese pride psychology.

In their classic book,

Managing Cultural Differences, they pointed out that the
Chinese have always held themselves in high esteem.

The

name of China translates as "middle kingdom," for the
Chinese saw themselves, their country, and their culture as
the center of human civilization( Harris and Moran, 1979,
p.393)

The Chinese expected that all other peoples and

nations would pay tribute and homage to them.

The situation

continued until modern times, when the Chinese met head on
with Europeans and Americans who did not understand this
attitude nor accept it as a condition for working and doing
14
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business with them.
international trade.
Harris and Moran

Thus, problems occurred in
As a solution to these problems,

(1979) suggested proper etiquette, personal

touch, dignity, reserve, patience, persistence, and a
sensitivity to and respect for Chinese customs and
temperament in negotiating with Chinese business people.
Similar to Harris and Moran's study of the Chinese
concept of dignity is Brunner and Wang's
Chinese concept of "face."

(1989) study of

According to Brunner and Wang,

the Chinese "face behavior" involves two sets of criteria by
which prestige is gained and one's status in society is
enhanced or attained.

Two words distinguish these criteria,

both of which mean "face."

"Lien" refers to society's

respect for an individual with a good moral reputation,
thereby perceiving him as one who fulfills his
responsibilities, regardless of the efforts and consequences
involved, and demonstrates decency as a human being.
The other concept, "mien-tzu," refers to the attainment
of an achieved status by working hard, negotiating with
skill, working well with others, and effectively applying
knowledge and personal judgement.

Nonpersonal factors, such

as authority, social status and wealth, also contribute to
mien-tzu.
In practice, as Brunner and Wang point out, the Chinese
emphasize that one should not only protect one's own face
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(lien) but also extend face

(mien-tzu) to others, which is

of equal importance.
In terms of negotiations, face is a reciprocal
relationship, implying respect and deference which each
negotiating party expects from the other, and, which in
turn, is extended to the other person.
m

Foreigners involved

negotiations with the Chinese must be cognizant of the

patterns of face behavior, endeavoring

to "give face" to

the Chinese, and avoiding actions which will cause them to
"lose face." To do otherwise is to ignore the importance of
the face behavior, its pervasiveness in social interaction
and its role in successful negotiating with the Chinese

(p.

44) .
Shenky and Ronen

(1987) conducted another study on

Chinese interpersonal norms which exert great influence in
Chinese negotiation behavior.

They found that Confucian

philosophy continues to provide the foundation of Chinese
cultural traditions and values, with the tenants of harmony,
development of one's moral potential, and kinship
affiliation having relevance for interpersonal behavior.
The Chinese preference for harmony and developing one's
moral potential suggests that American negotiators should
avoid overtly aggressive behavior in negotiations.

The

American task-oriented approach, which allows for the
admission of differences in the positions of the parties to
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a negotiation so as to promote "honest confrontation," is
viewed by the Chinese as an aggressive and is therefore an
unacceptable mode of behavior.

Thus, emotionally charged

attempts at persuasion remain likely to fail when directed
at the Chinese, and negotiators should consider other modes
of persuasion.

Also, the Chinese preference for kinship

affiliation indicates that American negotiators should take
a long-range view and enter negotiations even when they can
not determine immediate returns.

Similarly, during

negotiations, American firms may find it worthwhile to forgo
some advantages for the sake of establishing a long-lasting
mutual attraction.
In terms of nonverbal communications, Shenker and Ronen
point out that Americans negotiating with the Chinese must
learn not to interpret silence or the lack of direct eye
contact as either simple disapproval or disinterest, nor
should they necessarily respond to such behavior by making
additional concessions.

American negotiators should act

patiently in negotiations and should suggest brief recesses
more frequently so that, upon reaching an apparent impasse,
the negotiating parties may make decisions in private.
Pye

(1982), professor of political science at

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, conducted several
studies on negotiations between Chinese and American
business people. Pye, a specialist on Asian affairs, and an
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advisor to U.S. government officials negotiating with the
Chinese, conducted his research on the experiences of
American and Japanese business negotiators which led to his
book Chinese Commercial Negotiating Style, a classic book in
the field of negotiating with China.
Pye thoroughly studied the sources of difficulties
between the negotiation teams of the two countries, the
ambience of negotiation, the opening moves, the substantive
negotiating session, and the emotional basis for the Chinese
negotiating style.

According to Pye, the general sources of

difficulty arise from three areas:

(1), the newness of the

relations and lack of experience on both sides,

(2),

problems inherent in capitalist enterprises seeking to do
business with a centrally planned, socialist economy, and
(3), the cultural characteristics of both Chinese and
American--namely, the different concepts of friendship and
law.
In terms of the emotional basis for the Chinese
negotiating style, Pye indicates that the blending of
xenophobia and xenophila in the Chinese psychology explains
some of the strong behaviors of the Chinese negotiators who,
at one moment, may seem carried away with enthusiasm for the
novelty of foreign products, but then suddenly turn
defensive as they feel the need to assert Chinese
superiority.

Pye suggests that Americans take great care
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not to hurt the Chinese pride and remain alert to the
meanings behind their actions.

Finally, Pye recommended

staying patient and steadfast, preventing

exaggerated

expectations, considering seriously the general principles
of relationship, and mastering the record of previous
negotiations as techniques in negotiating with the Chinese.
In "The China Trade: Making the Deal,"

Pye

(1986)

discusses in great detail the differing negotiation styles,
concepts of things, and attitudes towards work between
Chinese and American negotiators.

According to Pye, the

Chinese are more restrained and more passive in
negotiations.

They simply ask questions and probe for

information, concealing any eagerness they may feel.

They

are wary of showing enthusiasm--an attitude that contrasts
sharply with the American salesperson's excitement at the
mere prospect of a deal. Pye describes the Chinese as quick
to talk about friendship and ready on short acquaintance to
call them "old friend."

"What may seem to Americans as mere

conviviality is to the Chinese an essential negotiation
element"

(p. 78).

The Chinese can make heavy demands on

friends and place few limits on how they use friendship to
material advantage, while the Americans see friendship as
built on a natural give-and-take.
In this study Pye pointed out that the Chinese and the
Americans have different concepts of reaching agreements.
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Americans believe that it follows a process of give-and-take
that culminates when both sides have maximized their
position while the Chinese negotiators see an agreement more
as a pledge from both sides.

They believe a bond is sealed

from the point where each side works out the benefits it
will receive.

At the conclusion of the study, Pye again

suggested patience and courtesy as remedy in negotiation
with the Chinese executives.
Lubman

(1983) conducted a study based on a decade of

participation in commercial negotiations with Chinese.

From

the perspective of a lawyer, Lubman identified some of the
problems Westerners encounter in commercial negotiations in
China and isolated certain unique characteristics of the
negotiations.

According to Lubman, the differences between

Chinese and Westerners in commercial negotiation exist at
the most obvious levels, such as the inability of each side
to speak the other's language or to grasp the subtleties of
etiquette that each culture expects. Less obvious, but
perhaps more significant, disparities may occur in the
perception of the nature and implications of basic concepts
so that the two sides often appear to be talking at, rather
than with, each other.
A specific illustration of such differences over
fundamental legal concepts appear in negotiations over
guarantees in licensing agreements.

According to Lubman,
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the language of guarantees to which the Chinese rigidly
insist the licensor agree is general and uncertain while
Americans demand specificity.

Moreover, Lubman pointed out

that the Chinese and Americans have different concepts of
the negotiation contract.

While the Chinese view the

contract as a commercial document which defines the desired
outcome of the transaction, Westerners view the contract as
a legal document which defines the responsibilities of
parties to each other and to third parties and the
consequent rights that each party enjoys.

Thus, the draft

contract suggested by the American side tends toward great
complexity and the revised contract suggested by the Chinese
side tends toward simplicity.

The lack of common conceptual

ground causes delays in negotiations.

Lubman suggests that

before the U.S. businessmen and lawyers come to China to
negotiate, they should inform themselves about the basic
negotiation concepts as well as Chinese bureaucracy to avoid
delays and misunderstanding in negotiations.
Davidson

(1987) recommends some solutions in managing

Sino-American commercial negotiations.

Before going to the

negotiation table, Davidson suggests that American firms
should prepare an initial written agreement of a set of
goals which provide a sound starting point for the
negotiation process.

The American team should also acquire

a translator familiar both with China and the business in
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question.

Davidson also advises that the American team

should know the negotiators and the authorities and how they
fit into the scheme of approval.

An understanding and

appreciation of the approval process is vital to each
potential tension at the negotiation table.

Further, in

order to avoid future problems and conflicts, Davidson
suggests that the foreign investors should consider as many
potential problems as possible and prepare written
procedures to solve them.

Many American firms already in

China offer "write it down" as their first bit of advice.
Frankenstein

(1986) conducted a survey among 26

American business people to determine which issues were the
most difficult to solve in negotiating with the Chinese.

He

names the following issues in rank order: price, technology
protection, valuation of capital contributions for joint
ventures, training for Chinese personal, delivery schedules,
penalty clauses, warranty protection, and determining
technical specifications.

Price comes as the first most

difficult issue because "price is uppermost in the minds of
Chinese negotiators"

(Frankenstein, 1986, p. 151).

One reason for the difficulty of the price issue,
according to Frankenstein, is that the Chinese bureaucrats
and managers want to make the best deal they can.

The

political and career consequences for not doing so can be
serious.

Further, Chinese enterprises, under the Deng
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regime's economic reform package, are now responsible for
both profit and loss and can retain portions of profit for
their own use.

Indeed, Chinese enterprises are under

considerable pressure to improve what the Chinese
authorities call "economic results."
As for other issues, most of them are caused by the
lack of experience in doing business with each other as well
as different conceptions about doing business.

Frankenstein

finally recommends that American business people use caution
in dealing with these issues with the Chinese negotiators.
Campbell and Adlington

(1988) conducted another survey

concerning the speed and ease in Sino-American negotiations.
Their study indicates that negotiating with the Chinese
tends to be slow compared to other developing countries.
However, negotiations in China have become much faster now
than previously.

The Chinese have become much quicker and

more practical at negotiating contracts.

Further, Campbell

and Adlington found the following factors make negotiation
in China go faster:

(1) the project is compatible with

central government development priorities;

(2) the project

is compatible with municipal and /or district priorities;
(3) there are few Chinese organizations involved;

(4) a

trading relationship already exists between the Chinese and
the foreign firm;
low;

(5) the complexity of the technology is

(6) the Chinese negotiators have previous experience
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negotiating with foreign companies and understand Western
business concepts;

(7) the composition of the Chinese

negotiation team remains stable throughout the proceeding;
(8) the foreign company stresses mutual benefit for both
sides; and

(9) the foreign company remains flexible and

creative during negotiations, rather than legalistic and
rigid.
Among other studies, Graham, Kim, and Robinson

(1988)

together conducted a laboratory simulation on buyer-seller
negotiations among 138 Americans, 54 Chinese, 42 Japanese,
and 38 Koreans.

The finding of the simulation indicates

that in negotiations between Americans, the use of more task
oriented, problem-solving approach positively

influences

negotiation outcomes. In negotiations between Chinese, more
competitive strategies led to better results.

In Japanese

and Korean negotiations, buyers achieved higher economic
rewards than sellers.

In all four cultures, bargainers were

more satisfied with negotiation outcomes when partners were
rated as more interpersonally

attractive.

Furthermore, the findings of the simulation indicate
that the behavior of Chinese negotiators is "generally
honest," very price conscious, and very competitive.
Chinese initially ask for a lot, make group decisions from
the top down, and let age and status affect negotiation
outcomes.

Graham, Kim, and Robinson also found that buyer-
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seller negotiation data for the Chinese group differed from
the American model of buyer-seller negotiation.

Problem-

solving bargaining strategies had a direct and negative
effect on the Chinese group's profit.

Chinese negotiators

who used more competitive strategies did better in the
buyer-seller

simulation.

Adler, Brahm, and Graham
on Sino-America negotiations.

(1992) offered a recent study
Based also on a laboratory

simulation, they examined the face-to-face buyer-seller
negotiation process.

They indicated that a problem-solving

approach was helpful for both the Chinese and the American
negotiators.

Such an approach, emphasizing the exchange of

information, appears to have facilitated partner
satisfaction.

Also, negotiator problem-solving

strategies

apparently encouraged partners to reciprocate with problemsolving behaviors, which, in turn, increased the
negotiators' own profits.

The authors suggest that when the

Chinese negotiators were positively attracted to partners,
they were also more satisfied with negotiation outcomes.
In addition, they point out that the Chinese bargainers
tended to ask many more questions and to interrupt one
another more frequently than their American counterparts.
Such subtle differences in style, according to them, may
cause problems in Sino-American negotiation, which, in turn,
sour otherwise fruitful commercial alliances.
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Among other recent studies, Hellweg, Samovar and Skow
(1993) have offered a comparative study on cultural
variations in negotiation style.

They point out that

Americans differ from the Chinese and other cultures in
three large aspects in negotiation:
business,

(1) rules for conducting

(2) the selection of negotiators, and

of decision-making.

(3) methods

According to the authors, American

negotiators assume an attitude of "economic gain" in the
negotiation process.

They expect others to display what

they conceive of as "American professionalism," including an
aggressive approach toward that which is to be negotiated.
They are uninterested in establishing long-term
relationships, and view socializing as unimportant.

The

Chinese negotiators, on the contrary, feel that mutual
interests and friendships are important in the negotiation
process, so socializing during the contract agreement
process is an expectation.

The nature of the relationship

between the parties involved is critical to the success or
failure of a negotiation.
In selecting negotiators, technical expertise serves as
critical concern in the selection of American negotiation
representatives.

The social background, education, and age

of candidates have little to do with their selection as
negotiating team members or leaders.

The selection of

Chinese negotiators is based on largely on status and
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knowledge, with age seniority being the single most
important criterion used in the selection of team leaders.
Also, Chinese negotiators expect to deal with someone of
authority and high status, and they feel slighted if they do
not negotiate with such individuals.
In the process of decision-making, the authors point
out that American negotiators view negotiations as problemsolving sessions, even if no real problem exists.

They tend

to compartmentalize issues, focusing on one issue at a time,
instead of negotiating many issues together.

For the

Chinese, decision-making is more authoritative with
decisions made by high authorities without the inclusion of
subordinates.

Also, the Chinese state their propositions in

the beginning and do not change it even if the opposing side
raises questions.
negotiations.

Concessions may come near the end of the

Hellweg, Samovar and Skow's study, although

brief, offers enlightening insight in the different
negotiation styles of Chinese and Americans.

It can serve

as guidelines for Sino-American negotiation.
Of all the previous studies mentioned above, each
offers new insight into the field of Sino-American
negotiation.

They have covered almost every aspect of Sino-

American negotiation.

Studies such as Shenky and Ronen's

(1987) interpersonal norms, Brunner and Wang's

(1989)

concept of Chinese face, and Hellweg, Samovar and Skow's
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(1993) cultural variations in negotiation style offer very
good understanding as well as sharp insight to Chinese
culture and Chinese negotiation behavior.

Also, Pye's study

on Chinese commercial negotiating style, although a little
cynical sometimes, has become a classic of Sino-American
negotiation.

However, all these studies, approaching the

subject of Sino-American negotiation from the American
perspective or Western perspective, offer only the American
view or "Western view" of the subject.
In the following chapters, I endeavor to approach the
subject from a different perspective--a Chinese view of
Sino-American negotiation.

Following a general overview of

nine important Chinese cultural factors, I will discuss the
influence of these cultural factors on Chinese conflictmanagement preferences and negotiation behavior.

CHAPTER III
CHINESE CULTURAL VALUES

Kirkbride defines culture as "the means for, and the
outcomes of, attempts by people to locate and confer meaning
upon their lives, experience, events, and objects through
the application of shared symbolic systems"
1991, p. 366).
Porter

(Kirkbride,

Cultural values, defined by Samovar and

(1991), are a set of organized rules for making

choices, reducing uncertainty, and reducing conflicts within
a given society.
Cultural values usually derive from the large
philosophical issues inherent in a culture.

These generally

normative values inform a member of a culture what is good
and bad, right and wrong, true and false, positive and
negative.

Cultural values define what is worth dying for,

what is worth protecting, what frightens people, and what
types of events lead individuals to group solidarity.
Cultural values also specify important behavior and
avoidance behavior within a culture.

An exploration of

certain fundamental Chinese cultural values should offer not
only some insight into the perception and management of
29
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conflict situations among the Chinese business people but
also better understanding of the Chinese commercial
negotiation behavior.
The culture of traditional China encompasses diverse
and competing philosophies, including Confucianism,

Taoism,

Buddhism, Legalism, and a host of local traditions.
Nevertheless, the essence of traditional Chinese culture
resides in the philosophical traditions of Confucianism and
Taoism.

These two philosophies continue to provide a moral,

intellectual and social nexus for the Chinese psyche

(Cheng,

1986) .
In addition to this philosophical tradition, a body of
more recent empirical work also pertains to Chinese values.
Pye

(1982), in his Chinese Commercial Negotiation Style,

mentions four Chinese values: friendship, time, face, and
Guanxi, which are important to the understanding of Chinese
negotiation practices, while Shenkar and Ronen

(1987) have

studied five values in their research: harmony, hierarchy
(which includes the notion of conformity), reliance on
kinship affiliation, collectivism, and indebtedness, which
named also as reciprocity.

In Redding's

(1980) study, he

mentions another four values important to the Chinese
management process: holism or contextualism, polychronic
time, morality, and practicality.
Hall

In Beyond Culture, Edward

(1989) classifies Chinese culture as high context
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culture.

I have extracted, even at the risk of over-

simplification, nine key terms which depict core aspects of
Chinese value orientations and psychological processes and
which retain great relevance to conflict management
preferences and negotiation behavior.

These include

harmony, collectivism, conformity, holism,

contextualism,

time, high-context, face, reciprocity, and quanxi.

Harmony

Confucianism stresses the notion of harmony between man
and nature, between man and heaven, and between man and man.
The Confucian "Doctrine of Mean" urges individuals to adapt
to the collectivity, to control their own emotions, to avoid
confusion, competition and conflict, and to maintain inner
harmony.

Showing restraint is the responsibility of the

"gentleman" who, in the Confucian hierarchy, is the
cultivated and learned person situated above all others.
The cultivated person strives to maintain self-control
regardless of the situation and thus conform to the Chinese
ideal of "xinpinqihe" which means "being perfectly calm."
Furthermore, to promote harmony, one must carefully
control one's emotions in public.

Raw emotions

(even

righteous indignation), once expressed, threaten the
Confucian principle of harmony and tend to arouse strong
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distrust, if not antipathy, among individuals.

Therefore,

no one expects a well-mannered Chinese to depart
significantly from the norms of self-control.

The idea of

emotional control resides in the Chinese psyche.
When harmony is important in interpersonal
communications, politeness means more than showing common
courtesy: it approaches a formal, stylized behavior.

Such

behavior does not depend on individual discretion, but is
fixed according to social position and norms.

Polite

behavior is both expected and easily recognized, for
example, in elaborate preparations for invited guests, or in
the way one personally escorts one's guests beyond the front
door, either part way to their homes or to their next
destination.

Similarly, impoliteness is considered not

merely a simple oversight, but an insult not easily
forgiven.
The Chinese preference for restrained, moderate
behavior suggests that one should avoid overtly aggressive
behavior.

The American task-oriented approach, which allows

for the admission of difference in the positions of the
parties to a negotiation so as to promote

"honest

confrontation," is viewed as aggressive and, therefore, as
an unacceptable mode of behavior.

Thus, emotionally charged

attempts at persuasion are likely to fail when directed at
the Chinese, and negotiators should consider other modes of
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persuasion.

However, negotiation is a transaction processed

between both parties.

Chinese negotiators need to

understand and adapt to American culture and expectations in
negotiation as well.

Collectivism

Chinese societies

(including the People's Republic of

China, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan) have frequently been
described as "collectivist"

(Bond and Hwang, 1986; Hofstede,

1980; Lai and Lam, 1986; Westwood and Everett, 1987.

The

stress is not so much upon the individual and his/her
interests, but on the maintenance of members within the
society.

Collectivism is frequently contrasted with the

greater individualism and egocentrism said to be
characteristic of American culture or Western culture.
The collectivist position has implications for
relationships within organizations.

In problem situations

or non-routine situations, including conflict and
negotiation, a tendency may exist to locate the issue in
terms of its importance for the group, organizational unit,
or even society at large.

Efforts arise to avoid

antagonisms that unsettle the group or that place the
individual in confrontation with his/her group.
suggests that the value patterns associated with

It also
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collectivism will be likely to lead to the avoidance of
conflict and to the seeking of harmonious relationships and
collective positions within the organization.

Conformity

Conformity serves as a central theme in the traditional
Chinese societies.

The idea of conformity relates to two

key Confucian values.

First, it relates to the "rules of

propriety" which structure interpersonal relationships into
hierarchy dualities such as "prince-minister,"

"father-son,"

"husband-wife," "elder brother-younger brother," and "senior
friend-younger friend."

Each individual is to adjust

him/herself to these prescribed interpersonal

relationships.

Second, there exists the Confucian concept which emphasizes
that man does not exist as a separate entity but remains
inextricably bound within his context: his family, his clan,
and his sovereign.

Each individual is to conform to

prescribed social structures and relationships and to the
appropriate forms of social behavior.

Thus, there exists a

strong and ritualistically reinforced set of norms that
guides behavior and is difficult to negate.
Hofstede's

(1980) empirical study reports South-East

Asian Chinese-dominated societies scoring high on power
distance, a view corroborated by others

(Lai and Lam, 1986;
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Westwood and Evertt, 1987).

These societies

accept large

power distances between individuals, groups, and social
status, and they view this state of affairs as right and
natural.
A further conformity, then, exists to the natural power
relationships.

This conformity, together with the

associated collectivism, leads individuals to consider the
relationship between themselves and the other party as one
of the crucial factors in any conflict situation.

There

exists a tendency for the Chinese to avoid confrontation for
fear of disturbing the relationships and their mutual
dependence.

When a dispute begins between a supervisor and

a subordinate, the natural deference to authority will lead
to the subordinate accommodating the superior's wishes.

The

perceived authority and status of parties to an
organizational exchange has a strong bearing upon the manner
in which the exchange is able to develop and the types of
outcome that can be expected.

Hoiism-Contextualism

Redding states that a holistic perspective and a high
degree of sensitivity to context characterizes Chinese
thought process

(Redding, 1980).

Therefore, Chinese people

will attempt to relate a particular issue or event to the
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total situation and to the context in which the event or
issue occurs.

An unwillingness to separate specific from

the totality and from the wider context makes it difficult
to deal with particular issues in isolation.

This holism

and contextualism may, for example, take the form of placing
events and issues in their historical context.
When conflicts emerge, a tendency to diffuse them may
arise by locating the issue in terms of the wider scheme of
things.

For example, many American business people in China

have complained that

the Chinese negotiators like to bring

up the past mistreatment of China in regard to the present
issues at hand.

Thus, many American commentators warn

American business people to be very careful not to mix
present issues with the past performances.

However, this

process also connects with the search for harmony by seeing
issues as part of a united whole.

The Chinese will seek

harmonious relationship even when there are issues at hand.
They will make concessions at the very end of the
negotiation.

Time

In Beyond Culture, Hall

(1981) introduces two kinds of

time concepts: monochronic time
time

(P-time).

(M-time) and polychronic

According to Hall, monochronic time
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emphasizes schedules, segmentation, and promptness.
Polychronic time systems are characterized by several things
happening at once.

They stress involvement of people and

completion of transactions rather than adherence to present
schedules.

Polychronic time is treated less tangibly than

monochronic time.

Polychronic time is apt to considered a

point rather than a ribbon or a road, and that point is
sacred.

Redding

(1980) suggests that the Chinese perceive

time as polychronic, non-linear, repetitive and associated
with events, in contrast with what he takes to be a Western
orientation, where time exists as monochronic,
absolute and prompt.

sequential,

He quotes another philosopher's

comment about the Chinese concept of time:
Absolute time was hardly touched upon in Chinese
philosophy. With Chinese philosophers, time has
always been associated with events.
In Buddhism,
since events are illusory, time is illusory. As
such it moves on but will come to an end in
Nirvana.
In Taoism, time travels in a circle,
since a thing comes from non-being and returns to
non-being (Redding, 1980, p. 134) .
The polychronic time concept has implications for the
way to handle conflict situations in general and
negotiations in particular.
such as Pye

(1982) and Rae

China traders and communicators
(1982) have repeatedly referred

to the difficulties and frustrations that follow from
Americans encountering a different view of the time
dimension and different conceptions of urgency-

The
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different notions about the timeliness of events and about
progress represents a potential source of confusion between
American and Chinese negotiators.

It may mean that the

Chinese fail to provide, or fail to work to, a schedule that
American negotiators can identify.

The American may become

confused and frustrated at the apparent insensitivity of the
Chinese to time, procedure, schedule and deadline, and at
their habit of negotiating several issues at one time.

Face

Face has been defined as "the positive social value a
person effectively claims for himself by the line others
assume he has taken during a particular contact.

Face is an

image of self delineated in terms of approval social
attributes"

(Goffman, 1955, p. 213).

Face, a concept which

has universal application and significance

(Bond and Hwang,

1986; Ho, 1986), has particular salience for the Chinese.
This salience relates to the greater collectivism of Chinese
cultures and to the greater focus on "shame" as a method of
social control.
The Chinese express their concern about face in this
proverb: "People want their face the same as a tree wants
its bark."

Generally, there are two Chinese concepts of

face: lien and mian-tzu.

Lien usually refers to society's
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respect for an individual with a good moral reputation,
thereby perceiving him as one who fulfills his
responsibilities regardless of the efforts and consequences
involved, and who demonstrates that he is a decent human
being.

Mian-tzu, on the other hand, refers to the

attainment of an achieved status by working hard,
negotiating with skill, working well with others, and
effectively applying knowledge and personal judgement.
Nonpersonal factors such as authority, social status and
wealth also contribute to mien-tzu.

Currently, political

status remains a primary factor in determining an
individual's status in society.
Mien-tzu exemplifies the type of prestige emphasized in
the United States.

Mien-tzu

depends on personal effort and

nonpersonal factors, while lien is an internalized as well
as socialized sanction enforcing moral standards.
Furthermore, one can not gain lien, as one is expected to
live according to the precepts of his culture; favorable or
exemplary acts will, however, add to one's mien-tzu.

Thus,

a person's face relates to his station in society and not to
his personality.
In Chinese society one's face is not solely the
responsibility of the individual, but is influenced also by
the actions of those with whom he is closely associated, and
how he is perceived and dealt with by others.

The emphasis
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is upon the reciprocity of obligations, dependence and the
protection of the esteem of those involved.

The key to an

understanding of face dynamics, therefore, is reciprocity;
the Chinese emphasize that one should not only protect one's
own face but extend face to others.

Both are of equal

importance.
In conflict situations, aggressive behavior from either
party can damage the face of the other.

Not giving face to

a person is perceived as denying that person's pride and
dignity, so the Chinese maintain the implications of
antagonism and aggression and normally hesitate to engage in
such behavior

(Brunner and Wang, 1988) .

In addition, the

adoption of "face-giving" and "face-saving" behavior in
conflict situations is valued as means to maintain a sense
of harmony.

The Chinese view it as shameful to disturb

group or interpersonal harmony, a sensitivity rooted in the
culture which is developed but reinforced through childhood
rearing practices based upon shaming techniques and group
loyalty.

Shame

A number of commentators

(Pye, 1982, Cheung, 1986,

Brunner and Wang, 1988) characterize Chinese and other Asian
societies as "shame" orientated cultures, where shame refers
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to an interpersonal frame in which behavior is compared to
social norms rather than internalized personal standards, as
in Western guilt cultures.

Thus, despite the pervading

tendency to avoid aggressive behavior in conflict management
situations, one can not rule out the possibility of shaming
behaviors in certain contexts.
Brunner and Wang

(1988) indicate that the Chinese

shaming approach permeates Chinese relations with others and
is developed early in childhood as a means by which parents
maintain parental control.

The primary sanction is through

the arousal of the fear of abandonment.

The techniques

which are used in shame societies involve training in
controlling one's behavior manifested by morals and
perfecting one's behavior.

It is a feeling of inferiority,

embarrassment, dishonor, ridicule and a "loss of face" on
the shamed ones who sometimes goes so far as to commit
suicide because of loss of face.

In fact, shaming functions

as one of the major forces in Chinese group interaction; it
permeates Chinese relations and is used to control others.
The Chinese genuinely believe that if the other party can be
shamed into doing the right thing, the offender will be
grateful and not resentful.
However, when the Chinese use the tactic of shaming,
they can be easily satisfied by symbolic responses that do
not affect the substance of the issues being protested.

An
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admission that what was done may not have been appropriate
can, by itself, satisfy the Chinese without the need of
retraction

(Pye, 1985, p. 97).

Reciprocity

Like face, the principle of re-ciprocity or indebtedness
is a universal one, but in the Chinese societies the
concepts of "ranging"

(favor) and "Pao"

(reciprocation) have

particular salience:
The Chinese believe that reciprocity of actions
(favor and hatred, reward and punishment) between
man and man, and indeed between man and supernatural beings, should be as certain as a causeand-effect relationship, and therefore, when a
Chinese acts, he normally anticipates a response
or return.
Favors done for others are often
considered what may be termed "social investment"
for which handsome returns are expected (Yang,
1957, p. 291).

Thus, concessions made by one party are normally
expected to be responded to by an equal amount of
concessions made by the opposing party.

Favor is expected

to be reciprocated by the Chinese, and therefore they are
more willing to invest in conflict situations by initiating
a compromise solution.

While the principle provides a

justification for retribution, it is also likely to lead to
mutual benefit seeking and compromise rather than
destructive tit for tat.
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In short, the principle of reciprocity indicates that
the Chinese will surely expect favors or concessions from
the Americans if the Chinese have made concessions in their
negotiation with the Americans.

Similarly, the Chinese will

certainly return favors or make concessions to the Americans
if they have received favors from them.

This principle may

be also practiced in American, but it has great importance
in Chinese business transaction.

High Context and Friendship

Hall

(1981) categorized cultures as either high-context

cultures or low-context cultures.

In high-context

cultures

most of the information is either in the physical context or
is internalized in the people who are a part of the
interaction.

Very little information is actually coded in

the verbal message.

In low-context cultures, however, most

of the information is contained in the verbal message and
very little is embedded in the context or within the
participants.

In high-context cultures people tend to be

more aware of their surrounding and their environment and do
not rely on verbal communication as their main information
source.
Warrington and McCall

(1983, p. 5), among others, have

characterized the Chinese culture as a high-context

culture.
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In this culture people communicate allusively rather than
directly, and nonverbal communications and hinted meanings
are as important as the explicit messages.

Generally, the

Chinese people are highly sensitive to the effect on others
of what they say.

They weigh their words carefully and know

that whatever they say will be scrutinized and taken to
heart.

In face-to-face conversations, a few words spoken by

one party may contain a variety of meanings in it.

Chinese

people generally prefer indirectness and dislike
contradiction.

It is usually hard for a Chinese to deliver

a blunt "no."

They wish to please their interlocutors, and

they prefer inaccuracy and evasion to painful precision.
Unlike the Americans, who generally seek equality and
informality in their relationships, the Chinese put much
emphasis on personal relationships.

They distinguish levels

of friendships, separating the acquaintances from the
intimates.

Whereas formality and distance characterize

one's relationship with one's colleagues, one expresses
himself freely and openly only with his intimates.
The Chinese usually attempt to separate affective
association from economic association, preferring to do
business with friends but not intimates.

They regard as

valued business colleagues or acquaintances those with whom
one interacts regularly, whose behavior has become
predictable, and against whom one may apply limited
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sanctions without destroying relationships with them.

As

some American negotiators have noted, Chinese business has
the norm of keeping relationships going on long after
business has been done.
The Chinese perception of friendship as an important
factor in doing business with others determines the Chinese
outlook on the informal phase of the negotiation process.
In contrast to Americans, who may view breaks in the
negotiation process as mere relaxation or social gathering,
the Chinese regard behavior away from the negotiation table
as having importance equal to that during negotiation.
Because the Chinese develop close friends slowly, the
American negotiators should remain keenly aware of both the
limits of familiarity and specific social obligations
appropriate to the type of contact being made.

Also,

because the Chinese pay much attention to hinted meanings,
American negotiators should pay special attention to
nonverbal gestures in negotiating with the Chinese.

Guanxi

The concept of guanxi, which refers to the status and
intensity of an ongoing relationship between two parties,
also serves as an important factor in Sino-American
negotiation.

In a collectivist society, guanxi between two
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parties is extended to include other parties who are within
the social network of the interacting parties but who may
not actually be present in the interaction.

Thus, when two

parties interact, they will not only consider their own
relationship and its future but also their relationship with
those external third parties and how they will perceive and
receive the behavior of the interacting parties.
It could be argued, then, that one would be likely to
seek mutually satisfying compromise or accommodation if one
works with the anticipation of a continuing
with the other party-

relationship

The relationship particularly applies

if the other party is perceived to be of high social status
or associated with a prestigious social network.

On a

similar note, the traditional Chinese respect for age and
status also has a bearing upon conflict situations.

The

Chinese will be cognizant of the age and status of those
with whom they are in conflict, and that awareness will
affect the manner in which the situation will be handled.
Relationships with older people and those of higher status
will be more highly valued and there will be greater
attempts to maintain guanxi and to protect face in such
circumstance.

CHAPTER IV CHINESE CONFLICT-MANAGEMENT
PREFERENCES AND NEGOTIATION

1. Chinese Conflict Management Preferences

How do traditional Chinese values and cognitive
processes affect conflict management preferences?

In order

to answer this question, we need a theoretical framework for
describing potential conflict management orientations.
Perhaps the most well-known and widely accepted model is
that of Thomas

(1976), which identifies five different

conflict-handling styles--competing,

collaborating,

compromising, avoiding, accommodating--all of which result
from different levels and mixtures of assertiveness and
cooperation.

(See Figure 1 on next page.)

Competing is a power-oriented mode in which one pursues
one's own concerns at the other person's expense in a manner
which is both assertive and cooperative.

In this approach

one party attempts to talk with the other party in an effort
to find an interactive and mutually satisfying solution.
Avoiding occurs when one is unassertive and yet
uncooperative.

Interests are not articulated, and the

conflict is postponed to resurface at a later stage.
47

Figure 1
The Thomas Model of Conflict-Management Styles
Adapted from Thomas (1976)
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Accommodating represents a mix of cooperativeness and
unassertiveness and occurs when one neglects one's own
concerns in order to satisfy the concerns of the other
party.

Compromising represents an intermediate position in

terms of both assertiveness and cooperation and a situation
where both parties satisfy at least some of their concerns.
However, the conceptions of compromise may vary crossculturally.
The Thomas model is operationalized via the ThomasKilmann Conflict Model Instrument

(Thomas and Kilmann,

1976), which consists of thirty pairs of statements
describing different behavioral responses to conflict
situations.

Typical items contrast responses such as these:
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"I try to avoid creating unpleasantness for myself" and "I
try to win my position"; or "I try to find a compromise
solution" and "I sometimes sacrifice my own wishes for the
wishes of the other person."

Respondents are forced to

choose the response most typical of their own behavior from
each pair of statements, and the resulting pattern of
responses generates individual scores for each of the five
conflict orientations.

This model and instrument has

universal applications and can be used cross-culturally.
Specifically, it can be used as the theoretical

foundation

for Chinese conflict-management preferences.
As mentioned before, the traditional Chinese culture
puts much emphasis on conformity, collectivism and harmony.
These orientations combine to create social pressures and
expectations which influence Chinese people to be less
openly assertive and emotional in conflict situations.
Thus, they naturally lead to the adaption of high
compromising and avoiding behaviors and a relatively low
preference for competing and assertive postures.
cultural imperative towards harmoniousness,

The

group

mindedness, relationship-centeredness and the need to
maintain interpersonal equilibrium militates against the
adaptation of openly confrontational and overtly competitive
styles of behavior.
Similarly, a holistic perspective may at times lead to
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a consideration of the total situation, and the broader
context and meta-perspective may further work to reduce
antagonism that might otherwise surface in the immediate
situation.

The fear of shame as a result of damaging or

breaking social norms or damaging someone else's face also
leads Chinese people to avoid assertive or aggressive
styles.

All these characteristics suggest a likely

preference for compromising and avoiding styles.

The

conformist tendencies and hierarchical nature of the Chinese
social structure would also indicate the undesirability of
being too assertive in conflict situations.
Taking responsibilities suggests the risk of being
wrong; it also opens up the possibility of engaging in
behaviors that are perceived to be antithetical to social
expectations and the required mechanism of the hierarchy.
It may seem better to avoid that possibility by seeking safe
common ground or collective responsibility, or again to
engage in avoidance behavior.
The operations of guanxi, face, power, and reciprocity
are somewhat more complex.

The degree of assertiveness and

cooperativeness that a person can exhibit in a given
situation may depend upon known or perceived differences in
the authority, power, status, social connectedness, and face
of the conflicting parties.

An individual who is high in

organizational or social status can appear to be less
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accommodating, while his opponent may need to accede to him.
However, if the two parties are of similar status or are
closely associated, they will either compromise or
collaborate.

Thus, all orientations may occur in situations

of unequal status or power.

Even in unequal situations

there is value in maintaining guanxi, in saving face, and in
the widely held norms of reciprocity.

The nonassertive

styles of compromise and avoidance remain the clear
preferences in most situations.
The Chinese conflict management preferences have been
empirically identified by Tang and Kirkbride

(1986), who

report cultural differences in conflict management
orientations in Hong Kong Civil Services between local
Chinese and expatriate British executives.

The results of

the study suggest significant differences in conflict
management preferences with the Chinese executives

favoring

less assertive compromising and avoiding behaviors as their
dominant orientation while their British counterparts
preferred more assertive collaborating and competing
orientation.
Hwang

(1985) examined the social-cultural

stress,

coping strategies, and psychopathological symptoms of 180
married men who were household heads of families residing in
urban Taipei, Taiwan.

The age of the subjects ranged from

30 to 60 years and their socio-economic status from low to
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high.

On the basis of his results, Hwang developed a model

to illustrate the dynamic process of coping with
interpersonal conflicts in Chinese culture.

The model

indicates that, when facing an interpersonal conflict
situation, an individual may adopt an active or passive
coping strategy.

The active coping strategy includes two

alternatives: the mechanism of facing reality or the
mechanism of self-assertion.

The passive coping strategy is

mainly characterized by perseverance or avoiding.

Eighty

percent of Hwang's interviewees adopted the avoidance
strategy; only twenty percent adopted the self-assertion
approach.
Frankenstein

(1985) conducted a survey among 28

American business people in Beijing on the cooperativeness
of Chinese negotiators.

The result indicates that 77% of

the interview group felt that Chinese negotiators tended to
be cooperative rather than adversarial.
and Wang

Pye

(1982), Brunner

(1988) indicated similar findings: that the Chinese

conflict preferences were for accommodation, flexibility and
conciliation.

These preferences, together with the ones we

discussed above, can exert great impact on negotiation
behavior.

In the following chapters, I will discuss the

application of these preferences on the process of SinoAmerican negotiation as well as their impact on Chinese
negotiation behavior.
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2. Chinese Conflict-Management Preferences and Negotiation

In this section I shall examine the different phases in
Chinese business negotiation and the conflict-management
preferences of the Chinese in each of the phases.

Various

schemes have been suggested for breaking the negotiating
process down into its component parts.
original is that of Zartman and Berman
diagnostic, formula, and detail phases.
model is that of Druckman

One of the most
(1982), who talk of
Another

imaginative

(1986), who sees turning points

and crises taking negotiators over a series of negotiating
thresholds.

Frankenstein

(1986) introduced four phases of

negotiation: opening moves, assessment, end-game, and
implementation, while Cohen

(1991) found five phases:

prenegotiation, opening moves, middle game I, middle game
II, and end game.

For the sake of simplicity, I will use

the framework suggested by the Industrial Relations Training
Resource Center

(1980), dividing negotiation into four

general phases: exploration, expectation, solution and
finalizing.
The first stage is exploration, where the two sides
try to find out more about the position of the other and
their willingness to move from it.

In situations where the
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parties are new to each other, this stage would also
probably involve an exploration of the background,
personality and character of the other party.
stage is similar to Frankenstein's

In fact, this

(1986) first stage of

opening moves and also similar to Cohen's

(1991)

prenegotiation phase.
The second stage is expectation structuring, where the
two parties attempt to create favorable perceptions of their
own positions and unfavorable perceptions of their
opponent's.

Each party also attempts to condition the other

into an expectation of movement, concession, and compromise.
This stage is similar to Frankenstein's
phase and to Cohen's

(1986) assessment

(1991) opening moves.

The third stage is that of movement and solution
building.

Here, the emphasis is on linking issues, trading

issues and concessions, and on the movement from initial
positions in the search for an agreed basis for a
settlement.

The final stage is finalizing the agreement,

which involves the reading of a final agreement followed by
summarizing, recording and implementation.
A spiral is one way to visualize ana summarize the
model

(see Figure 2).
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The Chinese preference for compromise as a conflict

resolution method has implication for the exploration phase
of negotiation.

It could suggest that parties who expect to

reach compromise solution in the bargaining process will
correspondingly give themselves greater room for maneuver
and movement by setting higher initial demands or more
extreme initial offers.

This approach contrasts with those

who might prefer confrontational styles and who retain
greater expectations of resolving conflict on or near their
own terms.

In such situations, the negotiator might make an

initial demand or offer which is nearer to the potential
settlement

(Graham and Herberger,

1983).

The less assertive compromising and avoiding
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orientations of the Chinese also impact behavior in the
second phase of expectation structuring.

Lower

assertiveness means that the Chinese will tend to engage in
less extreme verbal posturing and aggressive positiontaking.

One would therefore expect less open argumentation

and debate in the negotiation process.

In fact,

argumentation or debates usually contain elements of
confrontation and offending, which are viewed as negative
behaviors in China and should be avoided.

Becker

(1986) has

traced this phenomenon beyond the narrow confines of
conflict-management situations and suggests that the Chinese
avoidance of open argumentation and dispute has its roots
not only in philosophical traditions but also in sociallinguistic and even geo-demographic factors.

For example,

the Chinese word " Mao ren," which means "somebody," is very
often used in situations when someone has done something
wrong and the misconduct or misbehavior needs to be
criticized or blamed.

Instead of mentioning the exact name

of the person who has misbehaved and who should be blamed,
the Chinese would mention "mao ren" did something and should
be criticized.

Further, people from North China speak more

polite language than people from South China.

The well-

educated people speak more polite language and have less
open argumentation than the uneducated people do.
As mentioned before, Chinese culture belongs to the
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high-context cultural groups where face and harmony retain
great importance and where people communicate allusively
rather than directly.

However, the Americans find it very

frustrating when the Chinese avoid making any clear
statement of position and argument in negotiations.

Where

Americans, because of their linguistic, social and
educational backgrounds, will usually proceed by assembling
a series of what they perceive to be logical points and
arguments about a specific set of issues, the Chinese seem
to remain at a level of general principles and of what is
often taken to be rather vague and ambiguous

language.

The American negotiators who are more used to the open
verbal explication of bargaining positions may feel that the
real issues of the Chinese are not emerging since the
Chinese appear concerned only about the general principles,
not the details.

However, it turns out, as the negotiation

progresses, that the general principles concerning agreement
on intentions and mutual goals are as important for the
Chinese as are the "real issues" for the Americans.
Becker

As

(1986)points out, "Confusion about the real issues

stems in part from a different perception of what the "real
issues" are and from a conceptual and linguistic difference"
(Becker, p. 31).
While the Chinese score low in terms of selfassertiveness, they may vary in terms of cooperativeness.
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This point is picked up by Pye

(1982), who argues that

Chinese negotiators oscillate between obstinacy and
flexibility:
At one moment they are described as being
stubborn, firm, and tenacious, willing to wait
with oriental patience for the other side to give
in; but they are also said to be realists, ready
to adjust quickly to imperatives of human
relations, and always anxious to be conciliatory
if given a chance. They are thus seen as being
both unyielding and highly adaptable, determined
to have things their own way, but also considerate
of the other side's requirements (Pye, 1982, p.
68) .
Generally, the Chinese will be obstinate in negotiating
whenever they feel that the "principles" of the relationship
are being challenged, their long-range objectives are being
challenged, or what is being proposed does not fit in lines
with their current economic plans and situations; otherwise,
the Chinese are very adaptable and flexible.

Pye also

suggests that Chinese flexibility is related to the initial
and terminal phases of the negotiation process.

It is

closely linked to Chinese practices of hospitality at the
beginning and to their style of arriving at settlements near
the end of negotiation

(p. 69).

This flexibility can be

further associated with the need to settle basic principles
that are holistic and contextual in nature in the early
phase and with the perception of the relationship being an
ongoing one that does not change in the later phases.

Here,

we come to know that during the middle phases the Chinese
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negotiator may be very obstinate and unwilling to move.
Thus, tactics in negotiation at this stage may involve
referring back to the general principles stated by the
Chinese and urging them to the adaptation of the principles.
The major implications of the Chinese conflict style
preferences become most apparent in the third phase of
negotiation: movement and solution building.

In this stage

the conflict escaping behaviors adopted by Chinese
individuals make the resolution of conflict very difficult
and slow.

On the other hand, the relative preference for

compromise solutions can affect the dynamics of this stage.
However, despite the lack of concern for time pressures and
long delays in negotiation, the Chinese are quite capable of
suddenly constructing a compromise solution at this stage
without any previous explicit verbal processes of linkage
and trading.

This sudden compromise is both a function of

their expectation of the acceptability of a compromise and
the greater amount of time spent in the earlier phases of
negotiation.

It is often put in terms of an inevitable

discovery of a solution that is of "mutual benefit" by the
Chinese terms.

It is the idea of the Chinese negotiators

that "mutual benefit" is held to be both desirable and
discoverable right from the beginning and that the search
for this mutual benefit is what the negotiation process is
all about.

The preliminary discussion on basic principles
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will attempt to cast the negotiation in this light.
Another true explanation of the sudden compromise of
the Chinese at the end of the negotiation is that after a
long time of negotiation the Chinese have thoroughly studied
the position of their opposing party and have come to the
conclusion that their own benefit has been maximized.

Thus,

they make sudden and unpredicted compromises near the end of
negotiation.
Concerning the concept of compromise, different notions
exist between Chinese and Americans.

In the United States,

compromise is generally seen as a process of "horse trading,
trade-offs, give-and-take, and mutual concessions."
However, the Chinese, as Pye notes, "apparently see less
inherent merit in the concept of compromise than Americans
do.

Instead, the Chinese prefer to hold up for praise the

ideals of mutual interests, of joint endeavors, and of
commonality of purpose"

(p. 77).

As is perhaps already

clear, this concept of compromise could be a direct result
of the influence of the traditional Chinese values.

The

effect is that the Chinese will set high opening positions
and be willing to move to a compromise position--a common
enough process.

However, when they reach the point of

settlement, they prefer to think that a retreat is conducted
by both sides and that all along both sides have had their
mutual interests realized finally.
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Thus, for Americans, compromise is acknowledged as a
necessary but sub-optimal solution where concessions are
articulated and justified by identical concessions from the
other side.

For the Chinese, compromise is acknowledged as

the reconciliation of mutual interests through a commonality
of purpose and thus as optimum solution.

These divergent

views obviously have important implications for the tactics
to be adopted in cross-cultural negotiations.

CHAPTER V
CHINESE NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR AND
CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS

In this chapter I will discuss the application of the
Chinese cultural factors on Chinese negotiation behaviors.
For the sake of clarity, I will divide this chapter into two
parts:

(1)general applications of the cultural factors and

(2) applications of the cultural factors to specific stages.

Part I: General Applications

Traditional Chinese cultural values and cognitive
processes have great influence on the Chinese negotiation
and bargaining process.

First of all, the Chinese respect

for authority hierarchy, and power naturally leads to the
relative status of the parties to the negotiation becoming a
very important factor.

The Chinese take a keen interest in

people who are sent to negotiate with them and want to
ascertain their authority and status.

The status of the

opposition will be read as measure of the seriousness with
which the other party is approaching the negotiation and as
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a reflection of the level of respect being shown.

An

opponent of insufficient status may give rise to a loss of
face on the Chinese side.
suggest that

Thus, Brunner and Wang

(1988)

(the American team's) "president or other high

officials should initiate the process, and thereby give face
to the Chinese"

(p. 37) .

The Chinese respect for cultural traditions and social
etiquette means that negotiations can take on a high level
of formalism from an American point of view.

Traditional

Chinese hierarchies were in part maintained through a
developed system of rites and rituals.

Ritual remains a

feature of formal interaction between parties in China.
Generally, Chinese business meetings are highly formalized.
There will probably be a carpet on the floor, a coffee table
with a thermos of hot water, tea cups, expensive cigarettes,
and flowers for the occasion to provide the desired
atmosphere.

The interpreter will introduce the Chinese in

order of title or rank, and do likewise for the visitors.
All will then be seated properly by status, and polite talk
will continue which may be perceived by the Americans to
last for an unduly lengthy time.

The conversations will be

polite, and well-chosen language will be used in the
speeches.
Kazuo

(1979) notes that even when the Chinese

negotiator resorts to displays of anger and frustration, he

64
or she may appear to do so in ritualistic ways.

Certainly,

the highly formalized and ritualized behavior represents a
symbolic form that can be confusing to the foreigner.
example, Graham and Herberger

For

(1983) point out that the

Americans' stress on informality and equality can be found
in a "just call me Jack" mentality, blinding Americans to
the importance of status differences and formal gestures and
rituals.
Similarly, the Chinese emphasis on collectivity and
conformity means that the Chinese negotiation team will be
large, perhaps involving anywhere from five to ten times as
many people as are actually present with the foreigners.
Usually, the Chinese team will work as a group, not as
individuals.

While the head of the team plays an important

role in decision making, the whole group is responsible for
the whole process of negotiating.
In contrast to the American emphasis on individual
success, the Chinese emphasize the success of the group,
whether this group represents a kinship entity or a modern
administrative unit.

Anyone desiring personal gain and

benefits threatens established group hierarchies and risks
being accused of wild ambition.

The Chinese generally take

a negative view of any group member who actively seeks
attention.

The ideal behavior of a Chinese negotiating team

member is to separate the public from the private--that is,
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personal—interest.

Often individual group members feel the

need to reassure their colleagues that they do not seek
personal gain at the group's expense.

Consequently,

social

or organizational failure to cooperate is frequently
attributed to personal jealousy.

An American who tries to

influence a Chinese counterpart by suggesting that this
person will gain personal benefits will soon discover that
such an approach will fail.

Thus, the American negotiators

should always approach the Chinese negotiation team as a
group, never as individuals.
Further, the high-context culture of the Chinese
indicates that keeping harmony and face in negotiation is
very important to the Chinese, who will, by all means, try
to avoid any open confrontations and conflicts as much as
possible and who will shun any proposal-counter-proposal
style of negotiating.

They will make decisions privately or

behind the scenes so that they may preserve both harmony and
face.

Brunner and Wang

(1988) suggest that Americans should

learn to "give face" while dealing with the Chinese.

They

should go to great lengths not to embarrass their Chinese
counterparts and cause them to "lose face."

In

negotiations, if the Chinese negotiators have made an error,
they will probably try to ignore the error or cover it up in
order to save face.

Thus, unless it is of major

consequence, Americans should not comment on the Chinese
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behavior, even though the Americans themselves have
committed the error, they will admit it and rectify the
problem.
Furthermore, the Chinese perception of time and the
Chinese values of persistence and patience combine to ensure
that negotiations continue longer than would be expected in
the West.

In China, the cultural values work with

bureaucratic systems to produce "a rather round about
process that proceeds at a leisurely pace through several
phases"

(Frankenstein, 1986).

In fact, negotiators for the

Chinese side generally possess little or no actual decisionmaking authority.

They must review any proposals or

agreements with their superiors or higher authorities to
gain approval.
of time.

These decisions may take an extended period

There are many tales of American business persons

becoming very frustrated at the protracted nature of Chinese
negotiations; this practice of protraction is compounded by
an absence of any schedules so that there is no notion of
time frame involved.
The Chinese place considerable emphasis upon personal
relationships, even in the business context.

This mode of

behavior is manifested and reinforced by the notion of
guanxi.

The Chinese negotiator often seems to expect and

desire a level of personal relationship with his counterpart
that would be viewed as unnecessary in the West.

Pye
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(1982), perhaps somewhat cynical, tends to view this
emphasis on personal relationship as an attempt by the
Chinese to create some kind of emotional bond with the other
party and to spin a web of dependency.

The development of

personal relationships in negotiations is consistent with
the notion of guanxi and perhaps also with the notions of
"interpersonal equilibrium,"

"relationship-centeredness,"

and with a general collectivist orientation

(Hofstede,

1980) .

Part II: Application to Specific Stages

As described before, negotiations can be divided into
four stages: exploration, expectation, solution building and
finalizing.

During the first phase of the negotiation

process, exploration, a number of distinct behaviors can be
identified which appear to be related to the general Chinese
cultural values.

The first of these concerns is the

expanded length of time this phase can take in a Chinese
negotiation situation.

This behavior pattern is in part

explained by the concept of guanxi or relationship.

The

Chinese like to do business with friends, not strangers.
The setting of relationship or guanxi between the parties
not only can reduce the feeling of insecurity and
uncertainty of the parties but also can create a kind of
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affinity which will facilitate the later conduct of
negotiation.

Thus, the Chinese put much emphasis in setting

up a relationship with American partners and are very
careful in gathering information about their partner's needs
and perceptions through informal contacts.

For example, the

Chinese will try to find out through informal contacts what
the Americans really want from the business transaction,
what their position is, what kind of proposal they will
accept or not accept, etc.

All these processes obviously

delay the move to the second phase of the negotiation.
Another feature of what Frankenstein

(1986) calls the

"opening moves" phase of negotiation is the effort expended
on establishing basic principles and upon locating general
areas of mutual interests.

For the non-Chinese, the

emphasis on basic principles often appears to be merely
philosophical rather than strategic, or ritualistic rhetoric
rather than substantive content.

It is a mistake to view it

in these terms, since the principles may reflect the
necessary holistic view the Chinese are taking and that,
more pragmatically, will be used strategically in later
phases.
Chinese negotiators often seem to want to stay at the
level of generalities and to avoid details and specifics for
much longer than is common in the West.

This focus upon the

general principles and mutual goals may also reflect a
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culturally derived wish to postpone open confrontation and
direct conflict, which may be hard to avoid once specific
substantive issues are engaged.

One could argue, however,

that it is simply good negotiating strategy, since general
agreement to key principles by the other side at an early
stage can serve to bind them at a later stage.

Moreover,

the general principles agreed upon by the two parties at the
early stage express good intentions and good will, paving
the way for later successful negotiation.
During the second phase of the negotiation process, we
can see the impact of at least two central Chinese values.
The first value is the role of face.

Given the importance

of maintaining relationships and harmony, as well as the
prescriptions of the Confucian ethic, it is important that
each party gives face to the other.

Thus, the expectation

structuring phase can consist of extensive "facework," which
may appear to Americans as excessive flattery or humility.
Despite requirements to save face, the Chinese may use
"shaming" tactics in negotiations.

Chinese negotiators will

attempt to modify the other side's behavior or position by
inferring, usually somewhat indirectly, that commonly
accepted social norms and modes of behavior have been
broken.

In dealing with foreigners, they will attempt to

make references to what they take as the norms and values of
those societies or, referring to past actions or statements,
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they will demonstrate deficiencies or inconsistencies.

It

has been argued that the Chinese are very skillful at
picking out inconsistences and other deficiencies in the
opposing side's arguments and in exploiting them.

The

Chinese seem to take the view that they can directly
influence the behaviors of others by such "shaming" tactics.
This negotiation practice, according to Ho

(1986),

"reflects

the wider ethical order of the Chinese and is an extension
of traditional Chinese control and socialization patterns"
(Ho, p. 45).

However, during this second phase, the pace is

leisurely and the approach is indirect.

There may be an

emphasis on what some American negotiators call the "soft"
or peripheral issues.

The "hard" items come in the third

phase.
In the third stage of the negotiation process, the
Chinese holistic perspective has great influence.

As Yang

has pointed out, "Chinese people, especially adults, tend to
display a cognitive style of seeing things or phenomena in
wholes rather than in parts while Westerners tend to do the
reverse"

(1986, p. 147).

This tendency may, in turn, be

related to traditional Chinese values associated with the
concept of harmony.

"In this spirit, the Chinese will try

to synthesize the constituent parts into a whole so that all
parts blend into a harmonious relationship at this higher
level of perceptual organization"

(Yang, 1986, p. 148).
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For these reasons, The Chinese will adopt a holistic
approach to negotiation and b a r g a i n i n g — a approach which is
regarded as central to effective and successful negotiation,
even in Western literature.

As Graham and Herberger

(1983)

have noted:
Americans usually attack a complex negotiation
task sequentially—that is, they separate the
issues and settle them one at a time...thus, in an
American negotiation, the final agreement is a sum
of the several concessions made on individual
issues, and progress can easily be measured.... In
other countries, particularly Far Eastern
cultures, however, concessions may come only at
the end of a negotiation. All issues are
discussed with a holistic approach—settling
nothing until the end (p. 164).
This holistic orientation also displays the
characteristics of a polychronic time culture where time is
considered as a sacred point rather than a ribbon or road
and where people handle several things at one time.
When it comes to final stage of the agreement, American
negotiators have a natural tending to see the phase as the
ending or termination of a discrete social interaction and
relationship.

The Chinese, however, under the influence of

a collectivist framework and emphasizing personal
relationship and guanxi, will not perceive the reading of an
agreement as a final ending of a process.

The relationship

continues past the point of obtaining an agreement with a
different perception then of the conclusion of a negotiation
process.

For Americans, Pye

(1982) suggests, the whole
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process is viewed with an expectation that an outcome will
be accomplished and that adherence to an agreement will
provide for a period of stable and predictable behavior.
The Chinese do not see the process in discrete terms and
will not view a formalized contract as the conclusion of the
process.

Critics on current business negotiations with

China point out the different conceptions of agreements and
contracts and the tendency of the Chinese to attempt to
renegotiate the agreement even after it seems to have been
formalized and the documents signed.
This last point again reveals a very different
orientation on the part of the Chinese: "For the Chinese the
very achievement of a formalized agreement, like the initial
agreement on principles, means that the two parties now
understand each other well enough that each can expect
further favors from the other"

(Pye, 1982, p. 79).

Thus,

American business people should be very careful in doing
business with the Chinese.

Even after the contract has been

signed, they should be prepared that the Chinese will bring
up issues not discussed previously.
ready for new issues to occur.

They should be always

CHAPTER VI
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, I have identified some of the primary
Chinese factors which have great influence on Chinese
negotiation behavior and conflict-management

preferences.

Based on the cultural factors and Chinese negotiation
behavior, I offer the following recommendations for American
business people conducting negotiations in China.

Preparing for Negotiations

In preparing for negotiations with the Chinese, I
recommend that Americans do the following:
1.

Prepare an agenda for training and preparations;
include a special training program on American and
Chinese negotiating style.

2.

Consider as many potential problems as possible
and prepare written procedures to solve them;
write as much on paper as possible.

3.

Select negotiators whose style will be more acceptable
to the Chinese — that is, more restrained.
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4.

Select senior negotiators with high status to start
negotiations with the Chinese.

5.

Choose interpreters familiar with both American and
Chinese culture as well as the business in question.

6.

Know who the Chinese negotiators and authorities are.
Associate with the Chinese negotiators and the
authorities before the actual negotiation begins or
during the course of negotiation.

Talk to them during

informal interactions.
7.

Develop personal relationships with the Chinese
negotiators early in the negotiation process.

Treat

them as equals and friends, not as inferiors.

Carrying out the Negotiations

In carrying out negotiations with the Chinese, I
recommend that Americans do the following:
1.

Prepare initial written objectives with a set of
specific goals for doing business in China.

2.

Accept the Chinese offer of friendship in the
spirit in which it is extended.

The relationship can

have practical and materialistic dimensions as well as
a sentimental dimension.
3.

Emphasize the strategic, long-range process of
negotiation and the gradual accumulation of mutual

trust.
4.

Accentuate the similarities rather than the
differences between the two parties' bargaining
positions when beginning the negotiations.

5.

Plan for long negotiation sessions and allow for
frequent recesses for private consultation by the
negotiation teams.

Do not set a deadline for

conducting negotiations.

Expect continuous

delays.
6.

Prepare for misunderstandings and avoid open
confrontation and conflicts in negotiations with

the

Chinese.
7.

Avoid aggressive behavior and practice patience.

8.

Minimize expressions of emotion, and instead be
politely formal.

9.

Recognize that nonverbal gestures are as important
as explicit language.

Watch out for your nonverbal

behaviors as well as that of the Chinese.

Your

nonverbal behavior will be read carefully by the
Chinese, and the nonverbal behavior of the Chinese may
contain symbolic meanings as well.
10.

Remember that behavior outside negotiations is as
important as behaviors during the formal process

of

negotiation.
11.

Address the group as a whole, and do not attempt

to
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convince the Chinese to accept a position because it
will bring one or more of them personal gain.

Concluding the Negotiation

In concluding negotiations with the Chinese, I
recommend that Americans do the following:
1.

Before offering or accepting concessions,
carefully weigh the short-term benefits versus the
long-term debts the concessions will cause a party
to incur.

2.

Accept that you cannot define or govern your
Chinese company with any formal contract.

Learn to

shape it through the human relationships
established through the negotiations and the
actual conduct of business.
3.

Be willing to forego some advantages and details so
that a lasting mutual attraction may develop.

4.

When negotiations approach the final stage, allow
for a short delay before concluding them.

This time

frame will enable the Chinese to make decisions behind
the scene.
5.

At the successful conclusion of the negotiations,
show your appreciation to the Chinese that the
outcome of negotiation is to the satisfaction of both
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sides.
6.

Expect that new issues will occur and the Chinese
will bring up new issues even after the contract has
been signed.

Conclusion

This writer attempts to explore the cultural and
psychological origins of Chinese conflict management and
resolution preferences.

The cultural values and cognitive

styles forms only two of the many factors which influence
conflict behavior

(others include resource scarcities,

position power, and environmental constraints).

However,

these cultural and psychological factors are major
determining influences which need to be understood in order
to facilitate cross-cultural conflict resolution.
The paper also attempts to show how a distinctive
Chinese negotiating and bargaining style can be traced back
to conflict management preferences and more general cultural
positions.
In this study I attempted to approach the subject of
Sino-American business negotiation from a new perspective-a combination of the studies of national negotiation style
and the conceptual theoretical analysis.

I developed my

study on Thomas's theory of conflict management style, and
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analyze the Chinese conflict management resolutions to the
extent that Chinese negotiators generally prefer
compromising and avoiding style due to the influence of
traditional Chinese cultural factors and values.

Nine

cultural values have been discussed, and applications have
been made to the specific negotiation stages.
Nevertheless, this paper, based on library research,
has its limitations.

Further studies to this area should

come from the use of experimental simulations in both intracultural and intercultural settings.

However, only by

pursuing the naturalistic observation of actual conflict and
negotiating behaviors in both intra-cultural and intercultural settings can we fully establish the extent and form
of cross-cultural differences.
Finally, it is important to note that this study has
focused exclusively on conflict-management preferences and
not upon the dynamics of the conflict process.

Yet, the

processual dynamics of conflict episodes are as open to
cultural influences as are initial preferences for
resolution mechanisms.

Thus, much further study should be

conducted in this important field.
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